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Abstract
We consider the Stackelberg shortest-path pricing problem, which is defined as follows. Given
a graph G with fixed-cost and pricable edges and two distinct vertices s and t, we may assign
prices to the pricable edges. Based on the predefined fixed costs and our prices, a customer
purchases a cheapest s-t-path in G and we receive payment equal to the sum of prices of pricable
edges belonging to the path. Our goal is to find prices maximizing the payment received from
the customer. While Stackelberg shortest-path pricing was known to be APX-hard before, we
provide the first explicit approximation threshold and prove hardness of approximation within
2− o(1).
1 Introduction
The notion of algorithmic pricing encompasses a wide range of optimization problems aiming to
assign revenue-maximizing prices to some fixed set of items given information about the valuation
functions of potential customers [1, 11]. In a line of recent work the approximation complexity of
this kind of problem has received considerable attention.
Without supply constraints, the very simple single-price algorithm, which reduces the search to
the one-dimensional subspace of pricings assigning identical prices to all the items, achieves an
approximation guarantee of O(log n + logm), where n and m denote the number of item types
and customers, respectively [4, 6]. Corresponding hardness of approximation results of Ω(logεm)
for some ε > 0 are known to hold (under different complexity theoretic assumptions) even in the
special cases that valuation functions are single-minded (items are strict complements) [10] or unit-
demand (items are strict substitutes) [5, 7, 9]. In these cases, it is the potentially conflicting nature
of different customers’ valuations that constitutes the combinatorial difficulty of multi-dimensional
pricing.
Another line of research has been considering so-called Stackelberg pricing problems [15], in which
valuation functions are expressed implicitly in terms of some optimization problem. More formally,
we are given a set of items, each of which has some fixed cost associated with it. In addition to
these fixed costs, we may assign prices to a subset of the items. Given both fixed costs and prices,
a single customer will purchase a min-cost subset of items subject to some feasibility constraints
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and we receive payment equal to the prices assigned to items purchased by the customer. As an
example, we may think of items as being the edges of a graph and a customer aiming to buy a
min-cost spanning tree, cheapest path, etc.
Clearly, as there is only a single customer in this type of problem, conflicting valuation functions can
no longer pose a barrier for the design of efficient pricing algorithms. Yet, many Stackelberg pricing
problems - and in particular the aforementioned spanning tree and shortest path versions - have so
far resisted all attempts at improving over the single-price algorithm’s logarithmic approximation
guarantee. However, the best known hardness results to date only prove APX-hardness of both the
spanning tree [8] and shortest path [12] cases without deriving explicit constants.
In this paper, we present the first explicit hardness of approximation result for the shortest path
version of Stackelberg pricing, which we show to be hard to approximate within a factor of 2− o(1).
The result is based on a novel analysis of reduction that is quite similar to the ones previously
described in [12] and [14].
1.1 Preliminaries
In the Stackelberg shortest-path pricing problem (StackSP), we are given a directed graph G =
(V,A), a cost function c : A → R+0 , a distinguished set of pricable edges P ⊂ A, |P| = m, and two
distinguished nodes s, t ∈ V . We may assign prices p : P → R+0 to the pricable edges. Given these
prices, a consumer will purchase a shortest directed s-t-path P ∗ in G, i.e.,
P ∗ = argmin
{∑
e∈P
(c(e) + p(e)) |P is s-t-path
}
,
and we receive revenue rev(p) =
∑
e∈P ∗ p(e). We want to find a price assignment p maximizing
rev(p).
Throughout the rest of this paper, we will w.l.o.g. only consider StackSP instances for which
c(e) = 0 for all e ∈ P, i.e., every edge is either pricable or fixed-cost, but never both.
2 Hardness of Approximation
We are going to show that StackSP is quasi-NP-hard to approximate within a factor of 2 − o(1).
The result is obtained by a refined analysis of a construction very similar to the one used previously
in [12] and [14].
Theorem 1 StackSP cannot be approximated in polynomial time within a factor of 2−2−Ω(log
1−ε m)
for any ε > 0, unless NP ⊆ DTIME(nO(logn)).
2.1 Proof of Theorem 1
The proof of the Theorem is based on a reduction from the label cover problem (LabelCover),
which is defined as follows. Given a bipartite graph G = (V,W,E), a set L = {1, . . . , k} of labels
and a set R(v,w) ⊆ L×L of satisfying label combinations for every edge (v,w) ∈ E, we want to find
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a label assignment ℓ : V ∪W → L to the vertices of G satisfying the maximum possible number of
edges, i.e., edges (v,w) with (ℓ(v), ℓ(w)) ∈ R(v,w). The following hardness result for LabelCover,
which is an easy consequence of the PCP theorem [3] combined with Raz’ parallel repetition theorem
[13], is found, e.g., in the survey by Arora and Lund [2].
Theorem 2 For LabelCover on graphs with n vertices, m edges and label set of size k = O(n)
there exists no polynomial time algorithm to decide whether the maximum number of satisfiable edges
is m or at most m/2log
1−ε m for any ε > 0, unless NP ⊆ DTIME(nO(logn)).
Reduction: Let an instance G = (V,W,E) with label set L = {1, . . . , k} as in Theorem 2 be given.
Denote E = {(v1, w1) . . . , (vm, wm)}, where the ordering of the edges is chosen arbitrarily. Note
that in our notation vi, vj for i 6= j may well refer to the same vertex (and the same is true for wi,
wj). For ease of notation we denote by Ri the satisfying label combinations for edge (vi, wi).
(κ,λ) Ri
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Figure 1: Gadget for an edge
(vi, wi) in the label cover in-
stance. Each pricable edge
corresponds to one satisfying
label assignment (κ, λ) to ver-
tices vi, wi.
We create a StackSP instance as follows. For every edge (vi, wi)
we construct a gadget as depicted in Fig. 1. Essentially, the gadget
consist of a set of parallel pricable edges, one for each satisfying
label assignment (κ, λ) ∈ Ri and an additional parallel fixed-cost
edge of price 2.
These gadgets are joined together sequentially (see Fig. 2). Let
i < j and consider two pricable edges corresponding to label assign-
ments (κ, λ) ∈ Ri and (µ, ν) ∈ Rj . We connect the endpoint of the
first edge with the start point of the second edge with a shortcut
edge of cost j − i − 1, if the two label assignments are conflicting,
i.e., if either vi = vj and κ 6= µ or wi = wj and λ 6= ν. This con-
struction is depicted in Fig. 2. Finally, we define the first node in
the gadget corresponding to edge (v1, w1) and the last node in the
gadget corresponding to (vm, wm) as nodes s and t the consumer
seeks to connect via a directed shortest path. We will refer to the gadgets by their indices 1, . . . ,m
and denote the pricable edge corresponding to label assignment (κ, λ) in gadget i as ei,κ,λ.
Completeness: Let ℓ be a label assignment satisfying all edges in G. We define a corresponding
pricing p by setting for every pricable edge p(ei,κ,λ) = 2 if ℓ(vi) = κ, ℓ(wi) = λ and p(ei,κ,λ) = +∞
else.
The resulting shortest path from s to t cannot use any of the shortcut edges, because, as ℓ is a
feasible label assignment, out of any two pricable edges corresponding to conflicting assignments,
one must be priced at +∞. Consequently, no path using a shortcut edge can have finite cost. On
the other hand, since ℓ satisfies every edge, there is a pricable edge of cost 2 in each of the gadgets.
It is then w.l.o.g. to assume that the consumer purchases the shortest path using the maximum
possible number of pricable edges and, hence, total revenue is 2m.
Soundness: Let p be a given pricing resulting in overall revenue m + c and let P denote the
shortest path purchased by the consumer given these prices. We will argue that there exists a label
assignment ℓ satisfying c/4 of the edges in G.
First note that w.l.o.g. any pricable edge that is not part of path P has price +∞ under price
assignment p. In particular, this means that in every gadget i there is at most a single pricable edge
with a finite price. We call this edge the P -edge of gadget i. We proceed by grouping gadgets into
so-called islands as detailed below.
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Figure 2: Assembling the edge gadgets into a StackSP instance. Conflicting label assignments on
two edges (vi, wi), (vj , wj) are connected by a shortcut of length j − i − 1. All edges are directed
from left to right.
Islands: Let σ1 be the first gadget with a P -edge and call σ1 the start point of an island. Now
for each σi find the maximum value of j > σi, such that gadget j has a P -edge and there exists a
shortcut edge between the P -edges of gadgets σi and j. If such a j exists, define σi+1 = j, else call
σi an end point, let k > σi be the minimum value such that gadget k has a P -edge, define σi+1 = k
and call σi+1 a start point. If no such k exists, call σi an end point and stop. Let σr be the end
point of the final island. We call σ1, . . . , σr the significant gadgets.
Note that by construction every gadget with a P -edge is covered by some island, i.e., the interval
defined by some consecutive start and end points.
Fact 1 Consider an island σα, . . . , σω. Path P does not enter gadget σα or exit gadget σω via a
shortcut edge.
Proof: If P exits σω via a shortcut edge, then σω could not have been declared an end point. If σα
is entered via a shortcut edge, this shortcut must originate from a gadget i < σα which lies within
the preceding island. As P cannot bypass the endpoint of the preceding island via a shortcut, i
must in fact be the end point σα−1 and so σα could not have become a start point. 
Consider now a single island σα, . . . , σω. By ℓi we denote the length of the shortcut edge between
gadgets σi and σi+1 for α ≤ i ≤ ω − 1. Furthermore, by ini and outi we refer to the lengths of the
shortcut edges used by path P to enter and exit gadget σi, respectively, and set them to 0 if no
shortcuts are used. From Fact 1 above it follows that inα = outω = inα+1 = 0. See Fig. 3 for an
illustration.
For α ≤ i ≤ ω let the cost of path P between shortcut edges outi and ini+1 be ri + ci, where ri
denotes the cost due to pricable edges and ci the cost due to fixed-cost edges, respectively. We are
going to bound the expression pσi + ri. We note that ℓω = 0, since by the fact that gadget σω is an
endpoint, no shortcut edge connects its P -edge to the P -edge of another gadget. Similarly, we have
rω = 0, since path P does not use pricable edges between islands, as we have argued before.
Path P crosses the end node of the P -edge in gadget σi (node v2 in Fig. 3) and the start node of
the P -edge of gadget σi+1 (node v4 in Fig. 3) for α ≤ i ≤ ω − 1. The total cost of path P between
these two vertices is outi+ ri+ ci+ ini+1. An alternative path P1 is obtained by replacing this part
of P with the shortcut edge of length ℓi between σi and σi+1. By the fact that P is the shortest
path we have outi + ri + ci + ini+1 ≤ ℓi and, thus,
ri ≤ ℓi − outi − ini+1 for α ≤ i ≤ ω, (1)
where the bound on rω follows from the fact that for i = ω all summands in the above expression
are 0. Similarly, the cost of path P between the start node of the shortcut edge into gadget σi (node
4
v1 in Fig. 3) and the end node of the shortcut edge exiting σi (node v3 in Fig. 3) is ini+ pσi + outi
for α ≤ i ≤ ω. We obtain an alternative path P2 by taking only fixed cost edges of cost 2 to bypass
both shortcuts and gadget σi at total cost 2(ini+ outi+1). Again, since P is the shortest path, we
get ini + pσi + outi ≤ 2(ini + outi + 1), or
pσi ≤ 2 + ini + outi for α ≤ i ≤ ω. (2)
Combining (1) and (2) yields
pσi + ri ≤ 2 + ℓi + ini − ini+1 for α ≤ i ≤ ω. (3)
Finally, we have
ω∑
i=α
(
pσi + ri
)
≤
ω∑
i=α
(
2 + ℓi + ini − ini+1
)
(4)
= 2(ω − α) +
ω∑
i=α
ℓi + inα − inω+1 = 2(ω − α) +
ω∑
i=α
ℓi. (5)
Recall that σ1, . . . , σr denote the significant gadgets across all islands. Assume now that there is a
total number I of islands with start and end points σα(1), σω(1), . . . , σα(I), σω(I). Summing over all
islands we get that overall revenue of price assignment p is bounded by
I∑
j=1
ω(j)∑
i=α(j)
pσi + ri ≤
I∑
j=1
(
2(ω(j) − α(j)) +
ω(j)∑
i=α(j)
ℓi
)
≤ 2(r − 1) +m,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that α(j) = ω(j − 1) + 1 for 2 ≤ j ≤ I, ω(I) = r and∑r
i=1 ℓi ≤ m, since all shortcuts defining the ℓi are disjoint. Thus, we have m + c ≤ 2(r − 1) +m,
or r ≥ c/2 + 1.
Now consider the P -edges of the ⌈r/2⌉ gadgets σ1, σ3, σ5, . . . and their corresponding label assign-
ments (κi, λi). By definition, there are no shortcut edges between the P -edges of any of these
gadgets and, thus, (κ1, λ1), (κ3, λ3), . . . define a non-conflicting label assignment satisfying at least
⌈r/2⌉ ≥ c/4 edges in G. (Labels not defined by (κ1, λ1), (κ3, λ3), . . . can be chosen arbitrarily.)
Finally, consider a label cover instance as in Theorem 2 and the path pricing instance resulting
from our reduction above. If all edges can be satisfied, maximum path pricing revenue is 2m. If no
label assignment satisfies more than m/2log
1−ε m edges, maximum path pricing revenue is bounded
by (1 + 4/2log
1−ε m)m. This finishes the proof of Theorem 1.
3 Tightness
We briefly mention that our analysis is tight in the following sense. It is easy to check that by
assigning price 1 to all pricable edges we can make sure that w.l.o.g. the shortest s-t-path uses
a pricable edge in each of the gadgets and, thus, we obtain revenue m. Since maximum possible
revenue is bounded above by 2m (there is an s-t-path of that cost that does not use any pricable
edges), it follows that it is trivial to achieve approximation guarantee 2 on the instances resulting
from our reduction.
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Figure 3: Two consecutive significant gadgets σi, σi+1 inside one island. The length of the shortcut
edges used to enter and exit gadget σi (defined as 0 if no such shortcut exists) are denoted as ini
and outi, respectively.
4 Conclusions
We have proven the first explicit approximation threshold for any Stackelberg pricing problem. Still,
the approximation threshold for this kind of problem in general - and the shortest path version in
particular - is far from settled. The following questions seem to constitute fertile ground for future
research:
• Can we prove super-constant hardness of approximation results for any kind of Stackelberg
pricing problem?
• Is it possible to achieve a better than logarithmic approximation guarantee for the Stackel-
berg shortest path pricing problem? Is there an interesting restricted set of graphs on which
constant approximation factors are possible?
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